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INTRODUCTION  
 
Decisions taken by trustees have consequences. When trustees make 
mistakes, especially mistakes that cost the trust fund dearly, can the courts 
ever erase those errors and let the trustees unwind what they have done and 
start afresh? To do so, of course, has obvious advantages for both the trustees 
and those beneficiaries affected by the mistakes, but it is correspondingly 
disadvantageous for any outsiders who might be equally affected by the 
court‟s decision to erase - in England most typically Her Majesty‟s Revenue 
and Customs. For a long time, the answer to the question posed seemed to be 
yes. This invaluable „get out of jail free‟ card was delivered to errant trustees 
by virtue of what was routinely known as the rule in Re Hastings-Bass.The 
Supreme Court, the highest court in the land, has now indicated that this is not 
right, that Re Hastings-Bass has been misunderstood for over 23 years,
1
 and 
that trustees are not so roundly protected by such a rule. However, in reaching 
its conclusions, it appears that the Supreme Court may have abolished one 
rule and replaced it with another, which also seems to benefit trustees.  
 
ASSISTING TRUSTEES: DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURT 
AWARD OF A ‘GET OUT OF JAIL FREE’ CARD 
 
The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Re Hastings-Bass
2
 has 
now obtained the status of a „rule‟. The case concerned a power of 
advancement exercised pursuant to section 32 of the Trustee Act 1925. There 
were two settlements, one in 1947 and one in 1957. The trustees of the 1947 
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settlement transferred funds from that settlement into the 1957 settlement to 
be held subject to the terms of the 1957 settlement. Subsequently a dispute 
arose concerning whether estate duty was payable.  
The judge at first instance held that the 1947 settlement trustees did not 
effectively exercise the power of advancement in a manner which would 
demand that estate duty became payable on the settlor‟s death. The Court of 
Appeal reversed the decision of Plowman J. The operative part of the 
judgment concerned the rule against perpetuities; however, the following 
dictum expressed by Buckley LJ became known as the rule in Re Hastings-
Bass:
3
 
 
“where by the terms of a trust (as under section 32) a trustee is given a 
discretion as to some matter under which he acts in good faith, the 
court should not interfere with his action notwithstanding that it does 
not have the full effect which he intended, unless (1) what he has 
achieved is unauthorised by the power conferred upon him, or (2) it is 
clear that he would not have acted as he did (a) had he not taken into 
account considerations which he should not have taken into account, 
or (b) had he not failed to take into account considerations which he 
ought to have taken into account.” 
 
The rule in Re Hastings-Bass is primarily invoked in cases where trustees 
have exercised their discretion without a full appreciation of the fiscal 
consequences of doing so. In many circumstances, and somewhat peculiarly, 
the trustees themselves have sought to have their decision overturned on the 
dubious ground that they would not have exercised their discretion in the 
manner they did had they considered the full consequences of their actions. 
Mr. Justice Warner in Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd. v Evans restated the 
rule in positive terms: “Where a trustee acts under a discretion given to him 
by the terms of the trust, the court will interfere with his action if it is clear 
that he would not have acted as he did had he not failed to take into account 
considerations which he ought to have taken into account.”4  
The language of Mr. Justice Warner is significant; it bears on the issue of 
whether the trustee‟s action is void or voidable. His use of the term interfere 
suggested the appropriate remedy was voidness in contradistinction to mere 
voidability. Sir Robert Walker accurately emphasised the practical importance 
of the distinction between void and voidable when writing extra-judicially as 
a Lord Justice of Appeal:  
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“If an appointment made by trustees may be void, despite having been 
(to all outward appearances) arrived at and recorded in the proper 
manner, it may lead to great uncertainty. The matter might be raised 
many years afterwards, when the trust fund had been distributed (and 
tax paid) on the assumption that the appointment was valid. If on the 
other hand it was merely voidable, all the restrictions appropriate to 
the equitable remedy of rescission would come into play, including 
delay and the acquisition of third-party rights.”5  
 
The importance of having a rule with defined parameters is that it limits 
the discretion of the court so that consistent and foreseeable outcomes can be 
achieved. Furthermore beneficiaries under a trust are able to enforce their 
primary right under a trust – to require good administration by trustees – more 
readily where a rule, which operates on a trustee‟s discretion, is certain. 
Notwithstanding the ability of the courts to state the rule in Re Hastings-Bass 
clearly, its scope remained uncertain and varied from case to case. In Amp 
(UK) v Barker,
6
 the High Court held that to invoke the rule in Re Hastings-
Bass the court must be shown that the trustee might have acted differently and 
not necessarily would have acted differently. Mr. Justice Lightman in Abacus 
Trust Company v Barr
7
 required that there must have been a breach of trust to 
apply the rule in Re Hastings-Bass. The requirement that there be a breach of 
trust was subsequently disapproved by Lord Justice Lloyd in Sieff v Fox.
8
 
Lloyd LJ explained that there was no requirement to show a breach of duty 
before the rule in Re Hastings-Bass could be invoked.  
 
UNCERTAIN SCOPE: WHEN WILL THE COURTS DISPENSE 
THE VALUABLE ‘GET OUT OF JAIL FREE’ CARD? 
 
Errant trustees will be eager to engage a rule that effectively gives them 
another attempt at executing their power in a way which would benefit the 
trust. However the courts have been unclear on what was needed to invoke the 
rule in Re Hastings-Bass and what its remedial consequence would be. 
Uncertainty surrounding the scope of the rule had obvious disadvantages – 
chief among them being inconsistent applications of the rule. Lord Neuberger 
of Abbotsbury, writing extra-judicially, observed that due to this uncertainty: 
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“the Hasting-Bass principle infringes the most fundamental requirements of 
any legal principle”,9 which is, of course, certainty. 
Where the principle underpinning the rule was uncertain, there was 
difficulty with justifying the application of the rule. Was the rule in Re 
Hastings-Bass meant to operate like any other contractual vitiating factor? 
Lord Neuberger expressed concern that: “the circumstances where the 
principle applies are not in accordance with the law applicable to contractual 
transactions, where mistake only vitiates a document „when the element of 
consent is totally lacking.‟”10 Lord Walker expressed a similar sentiment and 
suggested that a more demanding, certain, and principled test could curb the 
unwelcomed tendencies emanating from the rule.
11
  
Three crucial uncertainties that surrounded the rule in Re Hastings-Bass 
lead to three questions: first, did the rule apply solely to dispositive powers? 
second, should the rule be governed by the requirements for rescission? third, 
did the application of the rule result in the transaction being void or voidable?  
In relation to the first question, it was unclear whether the rule in Re 
Hastings-Bass applied only to dispositive powers – that is power exercisable 
in respect of trust property in favour of objects – as opposed to management 
or administrative powers. In Re Duxbury’s Settlement Trust12 the decision of 
the Court of Appeal suggests that the power to appoint new trustees fell 
outside the scope of the rule. Similarly, the power to enter, vary or cancel a 
contract with a third party was held to fall outside the rule.
13
 Michael 
Ashdown defended the rule in Re Hastings-Bass. According to Ashdown the 
rule facilitated proper administration by trustees. If Ashdown‟s argument is 
correct and the rule was concerned with protecting „the beneficiaries‟ 
entitlement to proper performance by trustees of their duty to consider’14 there 
is difficulty in prescribing the rule only to mistakes related to dispositive 
powers. It is possible that the rule was restricted to dispositive powers in an 
attempt to provide added protection against errant trustees dissipating trust 
assets; however, it was unclear why added protection was not needed to 
defend against trustees doing things like saddling the trust with detrimental 
contractual liabilities. 
In relation to the second question, it was unclear whether the rule in Re 
Hastings-Bass should be made consistent with the requirements governing the 
                                                     
9
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rescission of deeds executed by mistake. The seminal statement outlining the 
test for mistake was made by Lord Justice Lindley in Ogilvie v Littleboy: “a 
donor can only obtain back property which he has given away by showing 
that he was under some mistake of so serious a character as to render it unjust 
on the part of the donee to retain the property given to him.”15 Mr. Justice 
Millet (as he then was) in Gibbon v Mitchell held that a deed will not be set 
aside unless “the mistake is as to the effect of the transaction itself and not 
merely as to its consequences or the advantages to be gained by entering into 
it.”16 The rule in Re Hastings-Bass merely required a failure to account for 
relevant information and thereby set a threshold for avoiding a transaction 
well below the Littleboy and Mitchell tests. Notwithstanding the rule in re 
Hastings-Bass was not grounded in mistake, if the remedial consequence of 
applying the rule was setting aside the transaction, it was unclear why the 
requirement of the rule was not aligned with those governing the rescission of 
deeds executed by mistake; which would have a similar effect.  
In relation to the third question, and in many ways the most controversial 
question surrounding the rule in Re Hastings-Bass was whether the 
application of the rule lead to the trustee‟s exercised discretion being declared 
void ab initio or merely voidable, and thereby made subject to ordinary bars 
of rescission (laches, third party rights etc.). Richard Nolan observed that “[i]f 
a fiduciary did have authority to do what he did, but acted on the basis of a 
flawed decision, then his action should be voidable, rather than void.”17 This 
view contrasts with the decision in Mettoy Pension Trustees v Evans where it 
was suggested that the appropriate remedy was a declaration that the exercise 
of power was void.  
Where a trustee fails to take into account relevant information before 
exercising their discretion, undoubtedly the resulting decision is flawed. The 
issue concerning whether the consequence was a determination that the 
transaction was void or voidable is not a trivial one, as the latter would have 
offered greater protection to third parties than the former. If the action was 
merely voidable it would stand until set aside, with the result that, for 
example, taxes would be payable on the transaction.  
These three uncertainties invariably made it difficult for the court to apply 
the rule in Re Hastings-Bass consistently. Much of the academic criticism 
aimed at the rule reacted to them. The general consensus was that a rule with 
such far-reaching consequences ought to be definite in scope and well 
structured so as to avoid abuse of the rule and unfairness to parties external to 
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the trust. Similarly, it was difficult to justify the existence of the rule in light 
of its inconsistency with established legal principles.  
 
SHIFTING RELIANCE: THE SUPREME COURT 
INTRODUCES FRESH UNCERTAINTY  
 
The decision in Pitt v Holt and Futter v Futter 
 
In Pitt v Holt the claimant, Mrs. Pitt, acted as the receiver for her husband. 
Mrs. Pitt, advised by professional financial advisers, gave no thought to 
liability for inheritance tax when executing the settlement. Consequently, 
large inheritance tax liabilities arose following her husband‟s death. The 
claimants brought an action for a declaration that the settlement should be set-
aside in reliance on the rule in Re Hastings-Bass, or, alternatively, relief in 
equity, relying on the doctrine of mistake. In Futter v Futter the claimant, Mr. 
Futter, settled assets on two discretionary trusts. The trustees exercised their 
power of enlargement so as to avoid incurring capital gains tax. However, the 
trustees‟ legal advisors had overlooked a statutory provision that undermined 
the premise on which the transactions were based. Consequently large capital 
gains tax liabilities were incurred. The claimants brought an action for a 
declaration that the enlargement and advancements should be set-aside also in 
reliance on the rule in Re Hastings-Bass. 
 
The Court of Appeal decision 
 
Although the decision of the Court of Appeal
18
 is superseded by the 
Supreme Court‟s19 decision, it is instructive to begin from the principled and 
well-reasoned judgment of Lloyd LJ, as much of Lord Walker‟s analysis in 
the Supreme Court builds on that judgment, and often merely restates what 
was said in the Court of Appeal.  
The Court of Appeal, while overturning the decision of the judge at first 
instance in both appeals, held that the so-called Re Hasting-Bass rule didn‟t 
actually exist, rather it was a rule developed on a misunderstanding of 
summary observations made in Re Hastings-Bass.
20
 His Lordship went on to 
attempt to explain the true principle. First, if trustees act outside trust power 
their actions are void.
21
 If on the other hand trustees act within power, but in 
some way improperly, provided they act in good faith and for proper purposes 
their actions will at best be voidable. Where a transaction is voidable it is 
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subject to the discretion of the court to set it aside, whereas decisions that are 
void are automatically vitiated and set aside. Second, where a decision made 
by a trustee is within power but the action gives rise to a breach of duty, the 
transaction will be voidable at the instance of a beneficiary who was adversely 
affected.
22
 
The significance of the Court of Appeal‟s decision was that it introduced 
that it is the beneficiaries who must control the exercise of trustees‟ 
discretionary powers. The law as stated by Lloyd LJ would preclude the 
trustees themselves from turning around after the event and saying “I did 
something wrong, get me out of here.” The policy underpinning this point 
must be correct. The power vested in trustees is for the benefit of 
beneficiaries; surely it must be the beneficiaries who bring a claim before the 
court with the aim of enforcing proper administration of the trust. It cannot be 
up to the trustee to decide whether to bring the claim or not and in effect 
decide whether to enforce the proper administration of the trust.  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal was adamant that only where a decision 
was made by a trustee in breach of duty, but otherwise within the trust power, 
would the transaction be voidable. As relief now turns on the fiduciary‟s 
breach of duty in making his decision, it is instructive to be aware of what 
duties the Court of Appeal outlined as pertinent when making decisions.  
Lloyd LJ outlined four duties of trustees: 
 
 the “duty to know what is the permissible area of selection and then 
consider responsibly, in individual cases, whether a contemplated 
beneficiary was within the power and whether, in relation to other 
possible claimants, a particular grant was appropriate”;23 
 the duty “that the power can be exercised only if it is for the benefit of 
the [appointee] or ... if it is thought to be „a good thing‟ for [the 
appointee to receive the appointment] ... That good reason must be 
beneficial to the person to be advanced; it cannot be exercised 
capriciously or with some other benefit in view.”;24 
 the duty to “address ... the question what is fair and equitable in all the 
circumstances. The weight to be given to one factor as against another 
is for [the trustees]”;25  
                                                     
22
 Ibid [99]. This represents a departure from Lloyd LJ initial observation in Sieff 
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Ch 303 (CA) 333. 
25
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 the statutory “duty of care, obliging [the trustees] to exercise such skill 
and care as is reasonable in the circumstances” or under the similar 
equitable duty, “which continues to apply to cases where the statutory 
duty does not.”26 
 
These four duties according to Lloyd LJ are owed until they are 
discharged, typically by performing the duty. The duties differ from each 
other and that is significant as to when the duty will cease to exist. Prima 
facie, the ability of beneficiaries to challenge a transaction based on an 
incorrect execution of a duty ought to be related to the strictness of the duty. 
For example, the first duty is a strict one – trustees must know the permissible 
area of selection. However, this was not the approach adopted by the Court of 
Appeal. Lloyd LJ appeared to say that trustees‟ decisions are immune from 
attack by simply being careful and reasonable: carefully getting professional 
advice and reasonably relying on it will result in proper performance of all 
four duties. If there is any flaw in what was otherwise a well-reasoned 
judgment it is this point of careful and reasonable behaviour translating to 
proper execution of duties absent any thought of how strict the duty is.  
To amplify, incorrect advice is simply incapable of allowing the trustee to 
know the permissible area of selection, even if they were careful in procuring 
the advice and reasonably relied on it. In such a circumstance there ought to 
be scope for beneficiaries to attack the resulting transaction, but the Court of 
Appeal said this is not the case. It took the view that it is an absolute defence 
that immunizes trustees‟ decisions from attack, where they receive 
professional advice and reasonably rely on it.  
In Pitt v. Holt (but not in Futter v Futter), the fiduciaries also argued that 
the transaction should be unravelled, relying on the doctrine of mistake. In the 
Court of Appeal this ground was unsuccessful. Lloyd LJ reasoned that 
notwithstanding a mistake had been made; it was a mistake neither as to an 
existing fact that was basic to the transaction, nor as to the effect of the 
transaction. Rather, the mistake related merely to the fiscal consequences of 
the transaction notwithstanding it was of „sufficient gravity‟ to satisfy the 
Ogilvie v Littleboy
27
 test.
28
 The Court of Appeal was at pains to ensure an 
appropriate and necessary structure, with sufficient rigor, for permitting relief 
against a decision taken under advice by a fiduciary.  
The strictness with which the Court of Appeal considered the law should 
apply equitable principles, is observant of the far-reaching consequences of 
these principles, and the ensuing disarray if they are applied enthusiastically. 
Indeed Conaglen supported a restrictive approach by observing, “constraints 
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28
 Futter (n 19) 219.  
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on equitable intervention are justifiable, in the interests of the stability of 
voluntary transactions.”29 Indeed a restrictive approach is apposite particularly 
in light of the unilateral nature of the mistake operative in circumstances 
giving rise to consideration of the rule in Re Hastings-Bass.  
 
Supreme Court decision 
 
Lord Walker concurred with Lloyd LJ on the main issues concerning the 
scope of the rule in Re Hastings-Bass, but he differed with respect to the 
requirements for invoking the doctrine of mistake.
30
 His Lordship observed 
that the error leading to what became known as the rule in Re Hastings-Bass 
occurred because of a conflation of three separate strands of legal doctrine, 
blurring their distinctions and resulting in a new rule distinct from what was 
actually decided in Re Hastings-Bass. Furthermore, his Lordship, in 
agreement with the earlier sentiment expressed by Lloyd LJ, commented that 
the rule would more aptly be termed „the rule in Mettoy‟.31  
With respect to the rule in Re Hastings-Bass, Lord Walker outlined three 
categories
32
, the existence of the third being a point of contention. The first 
category was termed excessive execution.
33
 Excessive execution concerns the 
scope issue and deals with circumstances where actions are performed which 
fall outside the legitimate remit of the trustee‟s power. The remedial 
consequence of excessive execution is that the transaction is void.
34
 It must be 
emphasised that motives do not factor into the scope issue – transactions 
entered into outside the power are void without further deliberation into the 
motives of the trustees.  
It follows that it is ideal for a beneficiary, who wishes to have a 
transaction unravelled, to argue that the trustee acted outside the power. 
However, a finding that the trustee did indeed act outside the power and 
therefore the transaction is void does not necessarily result in a favourable 
outcome for the beneficiary. It must be observed that voidness of the 
transaction and unwinding the transaction are distinct considerations.  
Although the following observation did not fall for consideration by their 
Lordships in the Supreme Court it may be instructive, nonetheless, to 
emphasise what appears to be a salient point. Where a disposition has 
occurred under a void transaction, unwinding can occur only where the 
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 Mattew Conaglen, “Reviewing the review of fiduciary discretions” CLJ (2011) 
70(2) 301, 303.  
30
 Futter (n 20).  
31
 Ibid [1].  
32
 The issue of mistake constituted a fourth and separate consideration.  
33
 [2013] UKSC 26; [2013] 2 WLR 1200 [60]. 
34
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individual receiving trust assets is a donee or where he is not equity‟s darling 
– viz. he gave consideration but with notice. The upshot being that a 
beneficiary has a further evidential burden after arguing the transaction should 
be declared void for want of power.  
Lord Walker‟s second category was termed inadequate deliberation.35 
Inadequate deliberation occurs where the trustee acts within the scope of the 
power, but the power is exercised without taking into account considerations 
that should have been considered or taking into account considerations that 
they should not have considered. The remedial consequence of inadequate 
deliberation is that the transaction is voidable if, and only if, taking into 
account the irrelevant information or not taking into account relevant 
information is a breach of fiduciary duty.
36
  
In effect, the second category requires a failure so inadequate that it 
amounts to a breach of fiduciary duty. From a policy perspective this 
tightening of the requirements makes it more difficult now than before to 
make a transaction voidable and thereby responds to the view of some 
commentators that the rule in Re Hastings-Bass was pro-trustee. Furthermore, 
the difficult „would have/might have‟ debate is out-flanked, as the 
requirement for a breach of duty replaces the consideration of whether the 
trustee, had he been properly informed, would have (or might have) exercised 
the power differently. Significantly, “[i]f it is voidable, then it may be capable 
of being set aside at the suit of a beneficiary, but this would be subject to 
equitable defences and to the court's discretion.”37 It follows that the proper 
plaintiff is a beneficiary and not the defaulting trustee. 
In the author‟s view, the decisions of the Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court raise a doctrinal question with respect to the second category – 
inadequate deliberation. Does category two include negligence? Inadequate 
deliberation, as defined by the Supreme Court can indeed cover negligence. 
The first category (excessive execution) is concerned with scope, but the 
second category (inadequate deliberation) appears to be concerned with 
procedure and therefore seems to embrace negligence. But there is some 
reticence about including negligence in category two because we typically do 
not unwind transactions for negligence. Negligent conduct typically results in 
a claim for loss. Undoubtedly future cases will have to refine this category so 
as to determine what the proper limitation of the second category is.  
Lord Walker‟s third category, expressed as an intermediate category 
between the first and second, is called fraud on a power. Fraud on a power 
occurs where the trustee exercises the power within its proper scope but for a 
                                                     
35
 Ibid [60]. 
36
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positively improper purpose.
38
 The cases cited under this category state that 
the remedial consequence of fraud on a power is that the transaction is void. 
The Supreme Court expressed some concern over this line of cases but 
declined to give judgment on whether this category was correct, as it was 
unnecessary for deciding the appeals. Richard Nolan,
39
 however, has 
commented that the fraud on a power doctrine prevents trustees from acting 
capriciously: it means that the trustees must not “act for reasons which… 
could be said to be irrational, perverse or irrelevant to any sensible 
expectation of the settlor.”40 It follows that there may be a benefit in retaining 
the doctrine subject to the court attenuating the remedial consequence of its 
application.  
The other issue that fell for consideration by the Supreme Court 
concerned setting aside a voluntary disposition for mistake. Lord Walker held 
that the true test “is simply for there to be a causative mistake of sufficient 
gravity[:] the test will normally be satisfied only when there is a mistake 
either as to the legal character or nature of a transaction, or as to some matter 
of fact or law which is basic to the transaction.”41 Additional guidance for 
applying the test outlined by their Lordships required that the gravity of the 
mistake must be assessed objectively in terms of injustice or using an 
equitable term, unconscionability.
42
 According to their Lordships this test was 
satisfied in Pitt v Holt and that appeal was allowed on this ground.  
Lord Walker‟s views on mistake in Pitt v Holt represent a marked change 
from his views expressed extra-judicially.
43
 Lord Walker and Lord Neuberger, 
both writing extra-judicially, advocated that the law be aligned with the 
requirements for avoiding a transaction on the grounds of non est factum. 
However, the test developed by Lord Wilberforce in Gallie v Lee, in relation 
to the doctrine of non est factum, is more exacting than the test stated by the 
Court of Appeal in Pitt v Holt. The Supreme Court advocated an even lower 
threshold for invoking the doctrine of mistake to avoid a voluntary disposition 
with the foreseeable untoward effect of shifting reliance from the rule in Re 
Hastings-Bass to mistake.  
The linchpin of the mistake doctrine is justice and/or unconscionability; 
but as is expected from the use of amorphous terms, they are fig leaves for 
boundless discretion and largely incompetent at producing consistent 
outcomes. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged that their decision would 
be subversive of certainty, but viewed this as necessary for working justice:  
                                                     
38
 See Cloutte v Storey [1911] 1 Ch 18 and Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372. 
39
 Nolan (n 18) 321; see also Ashdown (n 15) 826. 
40
 Re Manisty's Settlement [1974] Ch 17 (Ch) 26 (Templeman J). 
41
 Futter (n 20) [122]. 
42
 Ibid [126]. 
43
 Walker (n 6).  
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“The court cannot decide the issue of what is unconscionable by an 
elaborate set of rules. It must consider in the round the existence of a 
distinct mistake (as compared with total ignorance or disappointed 
expectations), its degree of centrality to the transaction in question and 
the seriousness of its consequences, and make an evaluative judgment 
whether it would be unconscionable, or unjust, to leave the mistake 
uncorrected. The court may and must form a judgment about the 
justice of the case.”44 
 
Having an elaborate set of rules and working justice in circumstances 
where a trustee has made a mistake while exercising discretionary powers are 
not mutually exclusive, as Lord Walker appears to suggest. Justice requires 
principled outcomes – the courts are more likely to arrive at a principled 
outcome where there exists a structured doctrine of mistake. The introduction 
of discretion raises the spectre of litigation rather than out-of-court settlement. 
Where it is suggested that a trustee was labouring under a mistake it cannot be 
said whether the mistake was causative and of sufficient gravity short of 
pursuing litigation and requiring the court to evaluate the circumstances 
surrounding the mistake. This raises transaction costs.  
Lord Walker‟s pronouncements about mistake in the Supreme Court were 
not merely cosmetic, or obvious, from the previous case law surrounding 
mistake. Whereas Lloyd LJ, in the Court of Appeal, had methodically worked 
through the previous case law to develop a principled and defined doctrine of 
mistake, Lord Walker stripped away certainty for discretion. The result is that 
there is now greater difficulty in determining the boundary dividing mistakes 
of causative significance, for which the court will provide relief, and those 
inadequate to invoke the discretion of the court. The decision as to which side 
a particular case falls will be susceptible to judicial manipulation, largely 
based on the court‟s perception of the merits of the claim.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The „get out of jail free‟ card delivered to errant trustees by virtue of the 
rule in Re Hastings-Bass meant that lower courts often found themselves 
bound by a plethora of case law that was largely unsatisfactory. Re-
organisation of the rule into a structured principle began with the Court of 
Appeal decision in Pitt v Holt and Futter v Futter and culminated in the 
appeal from that decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has now 
confirmed that Re Hastings-Bass has been misunderstood for over 23 years, 
and that trustees are not so roundly protected by such a rule.  
                                                     
44
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The Supreme Court‟s decision in the joined appeals of Pitt v Holt and 
Futter v Futter has clarified some of the uncertainties surrounding the rule in 
Re Hastings-Bass. In effect, their Lordships affirmed much of the Court of 
Appeal‟s decision, principally from the only fully reasoned judgment of Lloyd 
LJ. Lord Walker, reading the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court 
differed from Lloyd LJ on the mistake point and in doing so, it is argued, 
shifted the „get out of jail free‟ card away from the rule in Re Hastings-Bass 
towards mistake.  
Notwithstanding the success of the Supreme Court in organising the 
principles surrounding the rule in Re Hastings-Bass so that it does not operate 
capriciously, their Lordships introduced fresh uncertainty and continued the 
dubious assistance given to errant trustees through their ruling on mistake. As 
a consequence of the Supreme Court‟s conclusions much of the criticisms 
formerly levied against the rule in Re Hastings-Bass are likely to become 
criticisms of the doctrine of mistake. For better or worse the Supreme Court‟s 
statement of law is absolute. Trustees remain armed with a „get out of jail 
free‟ card, but the operative play is no longer receipt of wrong advice but a 
causative mistake.  
